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How Long Does Significant Public Policy Change Take to Enact?: A Look At Five Cases Studies

This paper seeks to provide insight into the steps and length of time that it takes to accomplish significant public policy change in the state of California. Specifically, this paper develops a timeline for five key public policy changes that were enacted in California in recent decades: Proposition 13, high-speed rail, redistricting reform, lowering local vote requirement for school bonds, and after-school programs.

These five case studies illustrate that significant public policy reform can take several decades to enact, from when the problem is first identified until when a significant policy change is enacted. For example, a look at the effort that lead up to Prop. 13 shows that it took almost 20 years to achieve what the proponents of Prop. 13 intended to accomplish.

It took almost 20 years for the state to approve a significant proposal to build a high-speed rail line connecting Northern California with Southern California. Redistricting reform took nearly 30 years and the effort to lower the local vote threshold for school bonds took more than 30 years.

This paper seeks to explore:

- 1) How and when was the issue first identified.
- 2) When did the idea start taking hold in the public policy making area (i.e. when did a consensus of policymakers and the public begin believing that the issue was a real problem that needed to be addressed)?
- 3) When did we see the first public policy proposal to address the issue (i.e. a bill, initiative, executive order, regulatory reform)?
- 4) When did proposals to address the public policy change fail?
- 5) When was the public policy change enacted?

(Note: The names of many of the sources used to write this piece were removed to protect their privacy)

Proposition 13: “People’s Initiative to Limit Property Taxation”

This is the longest and most complicated of the case studies that were looked at to produce this paper. The information used to write this section came from David Doerr’s book, the California Tax Machine (<http://www.caltax.org/publications/taxmachine.html>).

Prop. 13 passed in June 1978. The landmark tax reduction initiative, which was sponsored by Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann, reduced property tax bills by more than one-half and ended an assessment system that led to increasing property tax assessments year after year. The measure had four key provisions: 1) Limited property tax rates to 1% of specified value with additional rates only allowed for existing voter approved debt, 2) Set up an acquisition based assessment system that reassessed properties upon a change in ownership, 3) Enacted a 2/3 vote requirement to increase state taxes (as opposed to a majority vote), and 4) Specified that increases in local special taxes must be approved by a 2/3 vote of the local electorate (as opposed to a majority vote). The origins of Prop. 13 date back to the early 1960s. There were dozens of attempts to address state tax issues, particularly property tax reform, in the 1960s and 1970s but comprehensive reform was elusive and was not enacted until voters approved Prop. 13 in 1978.

1962—The origins of Prop. 13 date back to the early 1960s when taxpayers became increasingly angry about their increasing property tax bills. In 1962, retired businessman Howard Jarvis began meeting with groups of taxpayers in Los Angeles County who were angry about their rising property taxes.

1963—The California Assembly undertook a major study of the state’s tax structure upon the failure of Governor Edmund G. “Pat” Brown’s withholding program.

1965—In the beginning of the year, the California Assembly released its 12-volume study of the state’s tax structure which recommended sweeping changes in tax law and reform to reduce property taxes. The report noted the increasing burden of the property tax on taxpayers. In 15 years, from fiscal year 1950-51 to fiscal year 1965-66 property tax levies had quadrupled from \$791 million to \$3.37 billion. By 1977-78, the year in which Prop. 13 passed, the tax take was \$10.27 billion.

On January 27, committee Chair Nicholas Petris and Speaker Unruh announced the details of their tax reform plan (introduced as AB 2270). The bill reduced school property tax rates by 25%, established a standard ratio of assessment, and improved property tax appeals. In April, Governor Brown responded with his own reform package that included property tax reductions. Despite intense negotiations, the differences between the proposals went unresolved.

Mid-1960s –Several scandals involving California Assessors came about in mid-1960s. The assessors, who had traditionally had a lot of freedom in setting taxable value of properties, were found to be rewarding friends and allies with artificially low assessments, with tax bills to match. Some assessors were also found to be getting kick-backs from consultants who lobbied for lower tax bills for their clients. This led to the

passage of AB 80, an assessment reform bill in 1966. The bill provided for a standard assessment ratio by 1971, a taxpayer appeal process, conflict of interest provisions and mandatory audits, among other provisions.

1966—Assessment increases sparked a large number of tax protests in Los Angeles County. Increases in the Western part of the county averaged 84 percent. At a 700-person protest meeting in July, the Beverly-Wilshire Homes Association passed resolutions calling for, among other things, a 10% limit on assessment increases and property tax rate rollbacks. The Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee scheduled hearings on the problem in Los Angeles in June. The hearings focused on “highest-and-best-use” assessment problems in which many single-family home sites that were being assessed as future apartment sites.

1967—Property tax relief was high on the political agenda of California’s 33rd governor Ronald Reagan. In his 1966 campaign against Pat Brown, the GOP candidate called for new laws providing tax and assessment ceilings on property. But when Regan took office he found that he was forced to increase taxes. His tax package, which was approved by the Legislature in 1967, established a state-funded property tax relief program for low-income senior citizens and set aside \$190 million in property tax relief for homeowners.

1968— During the 1968 session, the Assembly sent four property tax relief bills to the Senate but they all died. While the Legislature squabbled over property tax relief, Los Angeles County Assessor Phil Watson and Howard Jarvis circulated separate initiative petitions to place a property tax relief package on the November 1968 ballot. Mr. Watson succeeded in qualifying his measure, but Mr. Jarvis fell well short of qualifying his measure. The Jarvis measure proposed to eliminate all property taxation except amounts required to amortize existing bonded debts or special assessment obligations. Mr. Watson’s measure, which became Prop. 9, proposed to limit property taxes and property tax assessments to 1% of value, phase out property tax support of education, and other services over 5-years, and allowed for certain bond repayments in excess of the 1% limit.

Qualification of this measure, encouraged Governor Reagan to call the Legislature back into special session in September. An agreement was struck and a \$324 million tax relief package passed the Legislature in September of 1968. Legislative Analyst A. Alan Post called it “the most comprehensive tax relief plan enacted in California since the Riley-Steward Act of 1933.”

The plan, as contained in SCA 1 (Miller) and SB 8 (Miller), included: a constitutional amendment (Prop. 1A) establishing a \$750 homeowners’ exemption and authorizing the Legislature to increase the amount. The statutory provisions provided a \$70 refund to every homeowner for 1968-69, and various other property tax exemptions for household goods and business inventories.

In the Presidential election of 1968, voters were faced with competing property tax relief proposals: Prop. 1A, sponsored by the Legislature, and Prop. 9, sponsored by Phil Watson. Governor Reagan took a strong stand against the measure and observers credit the popular Governor's opposition as critical in the defeat of the Watson measure. Prop. 9 as defeated by a 2-1 margin and Prop. 1A passed narrowly.

1969—As it turns out the property tax relief provided by Prop. 1A, was outstripped by rising property values and inflation in the early 1970s (increasing the homeowner's exemption was just a drop in the bucket). Skyrocketing assessments continued to be a problem for homeowners and the property tax issue was far from going away. Five major property tax proposals were introduced in the Assembly in 1969, but none made it to the Senate. No consensus developed on the issue because of the major differences in approach used by the measures.

In 1969, Governor Reagan again proposed a series of tax reforms including a statewide property tax of \$3.50 per \$100 on non-residential property (a split roll) for schools, a school property tax rate limit of \$1.10 per \$100 of assessed value and a 60% vote requirement to increase school property tax rates above this level. Reagan's proposal also proposed a local government property tax rate limit equal to each jurisdiction's 1969 rate plus 10% (which could only be exceeded by a 60% vote of the people) and a constitutional requirement of a 2/3 vote to increase state taxes. The Legislature killed the plan.

1970—After the failure of his property tax relief package in 1969, Governor Reagan decided to develop a consensus package for the 1970 session. The package, introduced as AB 1000 and AB 1001 (Bagley), was estimated to decrease property taxes by 27% but increasing a variety of other state taxes. The bill died after passing one committee.

1971—The California Supreme Court complicated efforts to develop a satisfactory property tax relief plan in its decision *Serrano v. Priest*. The Court ruled that California's system of funding public schools was unconstitutional because it unfairly discriminated against children who live in low-wealth school districts (those with low assessed value per child). Local property tax revenue used to go directly to schools which was a boon to schools located in areas with high property tax values. The Legislature had difficulty coping with the *Serrano* decision because the most obvious solutions were not politically viable. The problem was not solved until Prop. 13 established a flat property tax rate throughout the state.

In the fall of 1971, Governor Reagan convened a "tax summit" in an attempt to reach an agreement on tax reform. An initial deal was reached on increasing the homeowners' exemption but negotiations broke down when the Governor insisted that any property tax relief package have tight limits on local governments' ability to increase property taxes.

1972—The Governor put property tax high on his agenda for the session in his January State of the State message. Speaker Moretti introduced a bill, AB 1000, which called for

\$715 million in property tax relief. In June a deal was struck between Governor Reagan and Speaker Moretti. The measure passed the Assembly but failed in the Senate.

With legislative inaction continuing, two initiatives were targeted for the November 1972 ballot. The first measure—a 1% limit on property taxes, authored by Howard Jarvis—failed to qualify. A second initiative, developed by Los Angeles County Assessor Philip Watson, made the ballot. The measure was much different from his failed 1968 measure.

As Prop. 14, the initiative sought to limit property tax rates to \$7 per \$100 of assessed value, and prohibit the funding of welfare costs from property taxes. It also sought to increase the vote requirement for specified legislative tax increases from a majority vote to a 2/3 vote. The measure proposed a series of tax increases to make up for the lost revenue. Voters handily rejected the measure.

After the 1972 election, the Legislature passed a new property tax relief program as contained in SB 90. The bill increased the homeowners' exemption from \$750 to \$1,750 and enacted a system of revenue controls that were devised to limit school property tax rates, among other things. At the time, the parties involved believed the bill did a good job at responding to the *Serrano* decision and providing an answer to the property tax revolt. But SB 90 did not pan out as its supporters hoped. The property tax revolt soon continued and the Supreme Court found the program inadequate to address *Serrano* in a 1974 decision. The proposal did not address the issue of assessment control and taxpayers found that their property tax bills continued to increase without bound.

1973—The Legislature soon recognized the failure of SB 90 to contain property tax assessments and introduced bills in the 1973 session to further address the issue. Assemblymember Joe Gonsalves proposed to freeze homeowners' assessments at 1973 values (ACA). New dwellings and home improvements would be added to the roll at the value of comparable dwellings in 1973. Assemblymember Dan Boatwright, introduced ACA 89 which prohibited the reassessment of homes between sales. This proposal was the forerunner of the acquisition based system established by Prop. 13. Both bills failed in the Assembly.

The Governor also released a plan which he ended up qualifying for the ballot through the initiative process because it went nowhere in the Legislature. The measure, Proposition 1, included a state expenditure limit, maximum property tax limits for local governments, and a 2/3 vote for tax changes in the Legislature. The proposal was defeated at the polls.

1975-76—The year, 1974, was a quiet year but by 1975, property tax relief was back on the political radar screen. Assessments were increasing rapidly due to inflation but real incomes failed to keep pace. Several property tax proposals were introduced in 1975 which carried over in 1976 but all proposals for comprehensive relief were killed.

In late 1976, Howard Jarvis and the United Organization of Taxpayers began circulating petitions for another property tax reduction initiative, of which much was similar to what

was eventually contained in Prop. 13 but the petition drive fell 1,400 signatures short of qualifying. One month after Mr. Jarvis filed his petition, Paul Gann, filed an alternative measure to reduce property taxes. This effort failed to qualify for the ballot by about 20,000 signatures.

1977—By 1977, the Governor Brown Administration had heard the message that property tax relief was a top priority and supported legislation carried by Sen. Jerry Smith (SB 12 and SCA 1). This package provided for a state refund of a portion of property tax and revenue limits on local tax rates. Many legislators introduced their own measures. Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee Chair Willie Brown introduced AB 999 which was similar to the Smith bill. In the last hours of the 1977 session, the Legislature placed a constitutional amendment on the June 1978 ballot that would allow property tax rates on homes to be lower than the rates on other property (SCA 6, Smith). As Prop. 8 on the June ballot, this measure would be a key part of the Legislature's alternative to Prop. 13.

In the Spring of 1977, Mr. Jarvis and Mr. Gann decided to join forces and filed a new initiative petition that was to become Prop. 13. The measure qualified for the June 1978 ballot and eventually passed by a 2 to 1 margin.

1978—As the 1978 session began, it was expected that SB 6X (Rodda), a \$1 billion plan endorsed by the Brown Administration, would be the Legislature's alternative to Prop. 13. The plan increased the homeowners' exemption by \$3,000 and proposed a split roll revenue limit for homes which was tied to Prop. 8. In theory, the tax rate on homes would fall as home assessments increased. The bill, which became Prop. 9 and would only take effect if Prop. 8 passed and Prop. 13 was defeated, would enact a 30% reduction in the homeowner property tax and a state revenue limit to limit revenue growth by a growth factor. It was supposed to provide \$1.6 billion in tax relief, which was much less than the \$7.6 billion in estimated property tax relief provided by Prop. 13. Unfortunately for its proponents, the bill was hard to explain and would not be as effective as Prop. 13 at controlling assessments.

In November 1978, Prop. 13 passed by a 2 to 1 margin and Prop. 8 was rejected by 53 percent of voters.

High-Speed Rail

1983—The American High Speed Rail Corporation floated a proposal to build a high-speed rail train between Los Angeles and San Diego. The proposal went down because a number of wealth landowners objected to the train line being built in their backyard.

1990s—It was not until the 1990s that the push for high-speed rail heated up again. In 1990, then Senator John Garamendi proposed SB 1307 which called for a high speed rail transportation feasibility study. This study was followed by bills passed in the 1991-92

session, SB 1700 (Kopp) and AB 3600 (Costa), which set up a commission to study and implement an intercity rail system linking southern and northern California.

In 1993, the Governor issued an executive order which set up the High Speed Ground Transportation Task Force. Also in 1993, the Legislature passed SCR 6 (Kopp), which created the Intercity High-Speed Rail Commission. The 1994 Budget Act included an appropriation for the Intercity High-Speed Rail Commission.

1996—SB 1420 (Kopp) created the High-Speed Rail Authority and called for a high-speed rail construction and operation plan. The Authority would be abolished December 31, 2000.

2000—AB 1703 (Florez) called for a 2-year extension of the High-Speed Rail Authority.

2002—SB 1856 (Costa) Enacted the Safe, Reliable High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act for the 21st Center and proposed a 2004 vote for a \$9.95 billion bond proposal.

2002—SB 796 (Costa) Enacted the indefinite extension of the High-Speed Rail Authority.

2004—SB 1169 (Murray) Postponed the 2004 vote on the high-speed rail bond until 2006.

2006—AB 713 (Torrico) Postponed the 2006 high-speed rail bond vote until 2008. The bonds got delayed because the Legislature had other priorities in 2004 and 2006 including the passage of the infrastructure bonds and Prop. 42, requiring that gas tax revenues be used for transportation purposes.

2008—AB 3034 (Galgiani) revises and updates the bond act and establishes oversight processes for the independent review and approval of financing and engineering plans for the construction of California's high-speed train system. The Governor signed the bill in August 2008.

In November 2008, voters approved Prop. 1A which provides \$9.95 billion in bond funding to begin construction of the high-speed rail line linking Southern California Counties to the Bay Area and Sacramento.

Redistricting Reform

1970s—California's modern redistricting wars started in redistricting battles of the early 1970s. Governor Ronald Reagan twice vetoed plans passed by the Legislature and, in 1973, sent the issue to the state Supreme Court. The Court appointed three retired judges who drew Congressional and legislative maps that were used until 1982. Republican losses in 1974 led some to condemn the Court's plans as a stealth gerrymander but Watergate was said to be more of a factor.

Early 1980s—California’s redistricting plan done by then Congressman Phil Burton and the Democratically-controlled Legislature in 1981 created an uproar among concerned citizens of all political affiliations, according to the League of Woman Voters. The 1981 redistricting plans provoked charges that the majority (Democratic) party had taken advantage of its control of the executive and legislative branches to carve up the state to its own liking. The 1981 plans were subject to a referendum in June 1982, but in December the Legislature passed new Burton plans with a bipartisan 2/3 vote. Governor Jerry Brown signed the bill as one of his last official acts.

1982—Common Cause and the Republican Party led an unsuccessful effort in 1982 (as contained in Prop. 14) to require that a commission draw up redistricting plans, subject to referendum and with review by the California Supreme Court, according to the League of Woman Voters.

1984—The Republican Governor proposed redistricting by commission but the measure also failed to pass (Prop. 39). The measure was put on the ballot by initiative, according to a brief by California State University.

1990—Republicans and reform groups qualified two different redistricting reform measures in 1990 but both measures were rejected by voters. Prop. 118 would have required a two-thirds vote of the Legislature to pass any bill that adjusted district boundaries. Voters also rejected Prop. 119 which would have required redistricting to be conducted by a 12-member commission appointed by retired appellate judges, according to a brief by California State University.

2000—People’s Advocate qualified Proposition 24 for the March 7 ballot to transfer authority for reapportionment from the legislature to the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court removed Prop. 24 from the ballot, declaring it to be in violation of the single-subject rule for initiative measures due to the inclusion of unrelated provisions concerning legislators' pay.

2001--The Legislature’s redistricting plan was enacted in two separate bills: AB632 covering Senate and Congressional districts, and SB 802 covering Assembly and Board of Equalization districts. The bills passed the legislature September 13, 2001, and were signed by the governor September 26, 2001.

Good government advocates were left very upset by the Democrats’ redistricting plan which sought to protect incumbent legislators. The bills passed the legislature in Sept. 2001 and were signed by the Governor shortly thereafter.

2004— It was not until 2004 that lawmakers and advocacy groups coalesced around a reform proposal to respond to the issue. In 2004, advocates were sorting through reform options. There were ongoing conversations about using a commission to do redistricting. In December 2004, Assemblymember Kevin McCarthy introduced a bill that stated that it was the intent of the legislature to have redistricting done by an independent commission.

There were a number of other bills introduced during the special session held in December of 2004 but no deal was made because Democratic leaders remained opposed to reform efforts.

2005—In January, People’s Advocate submitted what became Prop. 77 which required redistricting to be conducted by a panel of three retired state or federal judges, selected at random by the Judicial Council. The proposal was voted down in November 2005. Two things happened simultaneously in 2005 which lead to a broad coalition forming around the 2005 reform effort. There was a group of moderate legislators who supported redistricting legislation modeled after Arizona’s redistricting reform. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger also came out and said that redistricting would be part of his package of reforms. Sources say that legislators and the Governor would have liked to have seen an initiative that was written different than what was submitted in Prop. 77 but when the first round of legislative negotiations went nowhere the Governor backed the People’s Advocate measure. There were a series of legislative alternatives still floating around as well.

2005-2007---There were a number of legislative measures introduced in the 2006-07 legislative session to reform redistricting by setting up an independent commission including SCA 9 (Ashburn), SCA 10 (Lowenthal) and ACA 4 (Villines).

2007—In August 2007, the League of Women Voters and California Common Cause hosted a press conference with Governor Schwarzenegger and former Governors Davis and Wilson to push for passage of a redistricting reform measure during this legislative session. In October, reform advocates filed language for an initiative to reform the state’s redistricting process after it became clear that it would be more of the same from legislative leaders.

2008—In May 2008, a broad coalition of groups turned in 1.2 million signatures that qualified the California Voters FIRST redistricting initiative for the November 2008 ballot. The measure created a 14-person independent citizens commission to draw legislative districts. It was approved by voters in November 2008.

Lowering School Bond Vote Threshold

1966—Los Angeles County Assessor Philip Watson qualified Proposition 4 for the November 1966 ballot. The proposed constitutional amendment would have reduced voter approval requirements for local bonds for schools and libraries from 2/3 to 60 percent. The measure was defeated, 53% no to 47% yes.

1980s—The first legislation on this issue was introduced in the early to mid-1980s, according to advocates. The issue has been out there since then. Prop. 13 reduced the amount of funding available to schools and local school districts had to turn to school bonds for additional funding. School advocates continued to monitor how local school bonds did and found that many received more than a majority vote but not the necessary

2/3 vote. (Note: I was unable to find any specific legislative proposals from the 1980s because those records are not available online)

1993—Voters defeat Proposition 170 by a large margin. Prop. 170, which was placed on the ballot by the California Legislature, would have allowed local school districts to pass school bonds with a majority vote as opposed to a 2/3 vote. School districts and community college districts would also be allowed to lift the 1% cap on ad valorem property taxes to pay for the bonds. This is the first measure that I found addressing this issue, I was not able to find much background on how this came about. The proponents listed were the California State PTA, Congress of CA Seniors, California Chamber of Commerce, League of Women Voters of California, Peace Officers Research Association of California.

1995—Senator Maddy introduces SCA 14 which lowers the vote requirement from 2/3 to a 58 percent vote for school bonds. The bill fails to pass the Legislature despite the support of a broad coalition of school groups.

1997-98—Senator Jack O’Connell and Assemblymember Mazzoni introduce bills to lower the vote threshold to a majority vote for school bonds. O’Connell’s bill, SCA 12, makes it out of the Senate but is held on the Assembly floor. Mazzoni’s bill failed on the Assembly floor by a vote of 43 to 31.

1999-2000—Senator O’Connell and Assemblymember Mazzoni reintroduce similar bills in the 1999-2000 session. Both bills meet the same fate, despite broad support from the education community.

In 1999, an education coalition qualifies Prop. 26 for the March 2000 ballot which lowers the local vote threshold from a 2/3 vote to a majority vote for school bonds. In November, the campaign receives more than \$3 million in support from a wealthy group of Silicon Valley executives. The measure is supported by AARP, the League of Women Voters, California Chamber of Commerce, and California Business Roundtable, among others.

2000—Voters defeat Proposition 26 in March of 2008. The education community regroupes and collects the necessary signatures to put a similar measure on the November 2000 ballot that lowers the vote threshold from 2/3 to 55%. Voters approve Proposition 39 in November 2008.

State Funded After-School Programs

1988—LA’s BEST (Better Educated Students for Tomorrow) after-school program was created by Mayor Tom Bradley to address an alarming rise in the lack of adequate adult supervision of children during the critical hours of 3 and 6 pm.

Mid-1990s—Advocates say the statewide movement to create and fund new afterschool programs began in the mid-1990s and was due to the success of successful local models such as LA’s BEST, Sacramento START, and programs in San Diego. These successful programs provided the foundation for additional state and federal funding for after school programs. According to advocates, the development of a local constituency and local champions was essential to initial and continued success of the movement.

1996—The California Wellness Foundation launched the Resources for Youth campaign to prevent youth violence. Polling conducted for this effort found that after-school programs were one of the most popular policy proposals to address youth violence. After-school programs were promoted in this campaign as a way to prevent youth violence.

1997—The Legislature approves AB 326 (Ortiz) which sets up pilot program and provides \$3.5 million in funding for afterschool literacy and extended-day programs targeted at low-income youth with working parents, according to the Afterschool Alliance.

1998—The Legislature passes three identical bills (three separate authors) to expand the pilot program established by the Ortiz bill and provide \$50 million in new funding. This new legislation created the After School Learning and Safe Neighborhoods Partnerships Program (ASLSNPP), which was designed to provide educational and enrichment programs after school in public schools across the state with an emphasis on low-income communities, according to the Afterschool Alliance.

2000—Boosted by proven success and popularity, as well as an expanded coalition of advocates, stakeholders and policy makers the ASLSNPP continued to grow. In 2000, the Legislature allocated an additional \$35 million in annual funding.

2001—The Legislature added \$14.85 million to fund a before school component and provided an additional \$14.85 million to the afterschool program. In the spring of 2001, Actor Arnold Schwarzenegger joins a group of after-school advocates to begin a statewide ballot initiative drive seeking additional funding for after school programs. This ballot initiative became Prop. 49—the After School Education and Safety Act.

The Legislature also approves AB 6 (Cardenas) which creates the Before and After School Learning and Safe Neighborhoods Partnership Act (BASSNPA) to be administered by the State Department of Education. The bill made various changes to the After School Learning and Safe Neighborhoods Partnerships Program (ASLSNPP).

The Legislature also approved AB 297 (Kehoe) which established the statewide Six-to-Six Before and After School Program, by allowing before- and after-school programs, in schools which do not meet the income priorities of the After School Learning Safe Neighborhoods and Partnership Program, to operate up to 30 hours per week without obtaining a child care license or special permit in a manner similar to local programs under the ASLSNPP.

2002—As of April 2002, there were 238 educational enrichment programs in the state that were provided with a total of \$117.5 million in annual state funding. In the fall of 2002, Schwarzenegger declared that nearly one hundred mayors, hundreds of elected officials, and more than one thousand PTA leaders, police officers, sheriffs, police chiefs, district attorneys, and education leaders have endorsed Prop. 49.

On November 5, 2002, Prop. 49 won the support of 56.6% of California voters. Prop. 49 earmarked a portion of state general fund money to before and after school programs in public schools, while providing priority funding for low-income areas. Funding was required to be \$85 million for the first year increasing to \$550 million annually as state revenues grow.

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